Saint Louis University Law Journal
Volume 62
Number 3 Teaching the Fourteenth Amendment
(Spring 2018)

Article 4

2018

Fundamental Frames: How Cultural Frames Inform the Fourteenth
Amendment
Anders Walker
Saint Louis University School of Law, anders.walker@slu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Anders Walker, Fundamental Frames: How Cultural Frames Inform the Fourteenth Amendment, 62 St.
Louis U. L.J. (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol62/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more
information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FUNDAMENTAL FRAMES: HOW CULTURAL FRAMES INFORM
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

ANDERS WALKER*
INTRODUCTION
Few axioms are more familiar in constitutional law than the idea that some
rights are so important they cannot be abridged without strict judicial scrutiny,
even if they are not textually enumerated in the Constitution. 1 Such
“fundamental” rights include the right to vote, the right to privacy, the right to
procreate, the right to raise children, and the right to marry. 2 However, many of
these rights boast a remarkably recent vintage, raising the perennial question
why they came to be recognized when they did. 3
The same could be said of certain rights that are referenced explicitly in the
Constitution, including for example the right to bear arms, which remained
dormant for much of American history, only to be declared an individual right
by the Supreme Court in 2008, 4 and then incorporated to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment in 2010. 5
Why certain rights are activated at certain times and not others tends to defy
straightforward doctrinal analysis, often calling for additional lecture on the
historical or political context of a particular opinion. From a teaching standpoint,
however, such discussions can be vague and rambling, often lacking the
doctrinal rigor that accompanies the various tests employed by the Court in other
contexts. To compensate, this Essay proposes that a mode of analysis be
imported from socio-legal studies to address the question of decisions that are
determined primarily by context, or what socio-legal scholars call cultural
frames.
This Essay proceeds in two parts. Part I will discuss the emergence of
cultural frame theory in sociology and political science. Part II will apply the
* Lillie Meyers Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.
1. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 849, 949 (5th ed. 2017).
2. Id. at 821, 831, 849, 851, 949.
3. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–99 (2015) (the right to marriage); Harper
v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (the right to vote); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (the right to privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942)
(the right to procreate); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (the right to raise children).
4. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
5. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
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theory in the context of the right to bear arms, showing how cultural frame
alignment provides a more precise analytic for understanding the emergence of
the right than either doctrinal analysis or simple mention of historical and
political context.
I. CULTURAL FRAME ANALYSIS
Beginning in the 1970s, sociologists and political scientists inspired by the
civil rights movement began to take an interest in the various ways that
movement organizers articulated reform agendas in terms that average people
could understand. 6 This led to the articulation of a concept called “frames,” or
“schemata of interpretation” that average folks used to “locate, perceive,
identify,” and in short, explain, events. 7 To be successful, activists needed to
construct their own frames, or schematic interpretations, that diagnosed social
problems, identified a clear prognosis of those problems, and then mobilized
target audiences to solve them. 8 These “collective action frames,” as they came
to be called, worked best when aligned with the ideas, assumptions, and beliefs
already held by target audiences, a technique that David A. Snow, Robert
Benford, and others called “frame alignment.” 9
Beginning in the 1980s, socio-legal scholars began to identify different
types of frame alignment, ultimately settling on four basic categories. 10 In the
first, social movement actors who attempt to link two separate collective action
frames, like gun rights and abortion, for instance, engage in “frame bridging.” 11
In the second, movement strategists who focus on one particular issue that
average people may otherwise be apathetic towards, like global warming,
engage in “frame amplification.” 12 Third, social movement actors who find little
support for their particular positions may have to broaden their reform agenda,
or engage in “frame extension” by expanding the boundaries of their claims to
6. Early works on the civil rights movement tended to focus on the formation of movement
structures. See, e.g., ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK
COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE 159 (1984); Lewis M. Killian & Charles U. Smith,
Negro Protest Leaders in a Southern Community, 38 SOC. FORCES 253, 257 (1960); August Meier,
Negro Protest Movements and Organizations, 32 J. NEGRO EDUC. 437, 437–39 (1963).
7. ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF
EXPERIENCE 21 (Northeastern Univ. Press 1986) (1974).
8. Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An
Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 611, 629 (2000).
9. David A. Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement
Participation, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 464, 481 (1986); Mayer N. Zald, Culture, Ideology, and Strategic
Framing, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES,
MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL FRAMINGS, 261, 265–67 (Doug McAdam et al. eds.,
1996).
10. Benford & Snow, supra note 8, at 624.
11. Snow et al., supra note 9, at 467.
12. Id. at 469.
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“encompass interests or points of view that are incidental” to their own goals,
but popular among their target audience. 13 Finally, movement actors who take
on a subject that has very little support at all, say same-sex marriage in the 1980s,
might have to completely transform popular opinion in what is called “frame
transformation.” 14
While the various strategies of frame alignment can help effect social
change, they by no means guarantee that activists will be able to overcome, or
for that matter transform the collective “stock of meanings, beliefs, ideologies,
practices, values,” and “myths,” shared by average people, or what socio-legal
scholars call culture. 15 Interest in the cultural boundaries of reform has led some
scholars to conclude that reform is ultimately contingent on either appealing to
or changing prevailing cultural norms, or what Mayer Zald has called “cultural
stock.” 16 While movement campaigns that reject cultural stock fail, argues Zald,
movement efforts that draw from existing stock, or reveal “contradictions” in
that stock, i.e., between prevailing prejudice and popular ideals, tend to
succeed. 17 So do movements that successfully transform cultural stock, either
by altering popular opinions, beliefs, or practices (frame transformation), for
example, or by linking movement claims to larger majority values (frame
bridging), both processes that fall under the larger theoretical umbrella of
“cultural framing.” 18
To show how cultural framing might be applied to better understanding, and
teaching, constitutional law, it is helpful to look at a case study in which activists
worked diligently to align their reform agendas with cultural frames. This was
the case with the Second Amendment, a constitutional right that did not get
incorporated to the states until 2010, after a period of active frame alignment by
gun rights lobbies and lawyers. Telling the Second Amendment story provides
an example of how the language of cultural frames can help show students why

13. Id. at 472.
14. Id. at 473.
15. This definition of culture is taken from Framing Processes and Social Movements.
Benford & Snow, supra note 8, at 629. Benford and Snow were themselves influenced by Stuart
Hall. See e.g., Stuart Hall, Gramsci’s Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity, J. COMM.
INQUIRY 5–27 (1986), reprinted in STUART HALL: CRITICAL DIALOGUES IN CULTURAL STUDIES
411, 439 (David Morley & Kuan-Hsing Chen eds., Taylor & Francis Group 2005) (1996). Other
scholars interested in the limits that cultural frames place on reform include JAMES M. JASPER, THE
ART OF MORAL PROTEST: CULTURE, BIOGRAPHY AND CREATIVITY IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 75
(1997) and Jeff Goodwin & James M. Jasper, Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural
Bias of Political Process Theory, 14 SOC. F. 27, 44 (1999).
16. Zald, supra note 9, at 270–71.
17. Id.
18. Sidney Tarrow, Mentalities, Political Cultures, and Collective Action Frames:
Constructing Meaning Through Action, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 189 (Aldon
D. Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992).
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certain rights appear at certain times, and why context is occasionally necessary
to explain constitutional law.
II. THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
Prior to the 1960s, organizations like the National Rifle Association
(“NRA”) had little interest in lobbying for a constitutional right to bear arms.
Founded in 1871, the NRA began its career primarily interested in recreation,
target shooting, and training, not defending the Second Amendment. In fact,
from 1871 to 1977 the organization’s main agenda was promoting
marksmanship and safety. 19 Organized by Civil War veterans disgruntled with
the Union Army’s lack of emphasis on “target practice,” a skill the military
believed would instill a negative “sense of individualism among the soldiers,”
the NRA built a “state-of-the-art rifle range” at Creedmoor, New York, to train
soldiers, primarily National Guardsmen, in marksmanship. 20 The NRA also
began holding shooting competitions, including an international competition
that drew almost 8,000 spectators to Creedmoor in 1874. 21 From 1874 to 1977,
“marksmanship training” and “firearms safety” remained the primary concerns
of the NRA while lobbying formed only a “minor part” of its institutional
mission. 22
Evidence of the NRA’s initial lack of political interest in gun control
emerged in 1934, when Congress enacted a sweeping National Firearms Act
(“NFA”) regulating certain types of machine guns, short-barreled shotguns, and
silencers. 23 While a strict textualist reading of the Second Amendment might
have justified challenging such a law, the NRA remained silent. 24 Part of this
had to do with the negative connotations of the guns themselves, all of which
were identified by the federal government as “gangster weapons,” 25 made
famous during a frightening wave of organized gang violence during the first
half of the 1930s. 26
By contrast, the NFA did not regulate “military-style” weapons, heavier
arms that the National Guardsmen training at Creedmoor might use. 27 In a 1939
case challenging the Act, the Supreme Court of the United States declared,

19. OSHA GRAY DAVIDSON, UNDER FIRE: THE NRA AND THE BATTLE FOR GUN CONTROL
20–36 (1998).
20. Id. at 21–22.
21. Id. at 23.
22. Id. at 29.
23. Pub. L. No. 73–474, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 5803–5871 (2012)); Brian
L. Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 48, 60 (2008).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”)
25. Frye, supra note 23, at 66.
26. Id. at 53.
27. Id. at 62–63.
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ironically, that the Second Amendment only protected military-style weapons
from federal regulation, not “gangster weapons,” hunting rifles, or any other type
of small arm that did not have an obvious military use. 28 To support this view,
the Court cited the text of the Second Amendment itself, which rationalized
limits on federal gun regulations because of the need for “well regulated” state
militias to the “security of a free state.” 29
Precisely because the NRA was in the business of training state militias, it
did not rankle at regulations controlling non-militia, “gangster” style guns. This
apolitical stance changed, however, when the federal government moved to
control military-style weapons in 1968. That year, Congress enacted the
sweeping Gun Control Act (“GCA”), spurred by outrage over the assassinations
of Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. 30 While older NRA leaders
tended to support the legislation, which “recodified” the National Firearms Act
of 1934, a younger cadre of activist-oriented “hard-liners” viewed the GCA to
be the beginning of a larger, liberal assault on gun rights generally in the United
States. 31 Led by a former Border Patrol officer named Harlon Carter, these
“Young Turks” voted proponents of the GCA out of power in 1977 and quickly
made lobbying against gun regulations one of the primary functions of the
association. 32
For constitutional scholar Reva Siegel, Harlon’s insurgents mounted a
relatively straightforward campaign of “popular constitionalism” aimed at
upholding an individual, not collective right to bear arms. 33 To do this, they
joined an “emergent New Right movement” that also sought “restoration of the
Constitution in matters concerning criminal defendants’ rights, gun control, and
other ‘social issues,’ including prayer, busing, and abortion.”34 From a teaching
standpoint, these moves reflected a type of frame bridging, an effort to link
disparate issues together, boosting support for all of them and resulting in a
larger transformation of “the Republican Party platform.” 35 A crucial part of this
platform was the appointment of Republican judges willing to frame
conservative legal causes, like the individual right to bear arms, in terms of
28. Id. at 62–63, 67.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
30. Crisis in the Cities, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1967, at 24; Hruska Opposed on Violence Unit:
Schlesinger Says Senator Fought New Gun Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1968, at 29; James M.
Naughton, U.S. Panel Urges Handgun Seizure to Curb Violence, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1969, at 1;
Transcript of Johnson’s TV Address on the Riots, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1967, at 11.
31. Registration Due on Certain Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1968, at 17; DAVIDSON,
supra note 19, at 30, 34; see also Anders Walker, From Ballots to Bullets: District of Columbia v.
Heller and the New Civil Rights, 69 LA. L. REV. 509, 531 (2009).
32. DAVIDSON, supra note 19, at 31, 36.
33. Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122
HARV. L. REV. 191, 192, 201–02 (2008).
34. Id. at 212.
35. Id. at 212, 215.
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“original intent,” a skillful way of “changing” the Constitution by avoiding the
amendment process and calling instead for the restoration of first principles. 36
A not insignificant amount of strategy went into the NRA’s litigation
campaigns. For example, despite the fact that the NRA vigorously pursued an
individual right to bear arms, it never challenged the GCA in court. 37 In a manner
that professors might find worth mentioning to students in class, NRA lawyers
carefully aligned their legal claims with cultural positions that they believed
most Americans would condone at the time, positions that did not include
combat weapons. This meant that widespread, private ownership of militarystyle weapons, AK-47s, M-16s, and so on, never made it onto the NRA’s
litigation agenda, even though past Supreme Court rulings like Miller indicated
that these were precisely the type of weapons that the Second Amendment
protected. 38
Why did the NRA, a diligent if not aggressive lobbying group, not promote
deregulating military style weapons through court cases? 39 Perhaps the best
answer is that American attitudes toward military-style weapons, the cultural
frame surrounding such weapons, if you will, evolved considerably from 1939
to 1968, moving away from images of responsible National Guardsmen keeping
guns safely in their homes, to radical extremists assassinating leaders and
plotting government overthrow. To take just a few examples, not long after the
GCA’s passage in 1968, stories began to break of people arrested under the law,
many with ties to right-wing extremism and organized crime. On June 5, 1969,
for example, Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms agents arrested Arthur Needles, a
supplier to right-wing groups and the mob in Suffolk County, New York, seizing
“dynamite bombs, machine guns, and dozens of rifles, shotguns, and
handguns.” 40 On July 19, 1969, federal agents arrested Robert Bolivar DePugh,
founder of “the ultra-right Minutemen,” a covert organization dedicated to
“stockpiling weapons” in preparation for a “Communist take-over of all

36. Id. at 217, 220.
37. Id. at 216. Arguably the only challenge to the GCA, as Siegel notes, was the 1986 Firearm
Owners Protection Act, which limited aspects of the earlier law. Pub. L. No. 99–308, 100 Stat. 449
(1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–929 (2012)).
38. Siegel, supra note 33, at 228. A distinction must be made here between the NRA’s actual
litigation strategy, and some of the rhetoric of its leaders. As Siegel notes, prominent NRA officials
like Tanya Metaksa did voice opposition to regulations of automatic weapons, though they never
dared bring a legal Second Amendment challenge to them in court. Id.
39. Some might argue that the NRA’s participation in Printz v. United States was part of a
larger opposition to federal regulation of automatic weapons, but this over-reads the claim in Printz,
which opposed background checks required by the Brady Act. 521 U.S. 898, 902 (1997).
40. High Bail Imposed in L.I. Arms Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1969, at 45; Robert D.
McFadden, Weapons Cache is Seized With 4 Suspects in Suffolk, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1969, at 1,
21.
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governmental machinery in the United States.” 41 More raids followed, of Nazis,
the Ku Klux Klan, the Black Panthers, and other groups, none of whom enjoyed
majority support. 42
In July 1969, the Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence
recommended “[f]ederal minimum standards under which the states would
restrict ownership of handguns.” 43 Among these standards were requirements
that handgun owners license their guns, or sell them back to the federal
government. 44 “[S]elf-defense,” argued the Commission, was not a sufficient
reason to limit regulation, and was actually more likely to result in gun owners
shooting “family or friends,” than burglars. 45
As the government moved to limit the rights of average individuals to defend
themselves, gun proponents began to push back, laying the foundations for a
more robust, individual-focused interpretation of the right to bear arms.
According to Republican Senator Roman Hruska of Nebraska, for example, the
question of regulating handguns in 1969 should be left to the states. 46 “[U]rban
unrest” contributed to this sentiment, as riots across the country “spurred sales
of guns” for use in self-defense. 47 When Chicago congressman Abner Mikva
proposed a ban on handguns in Illinois in 1971, he confronted significant
opposition in the Illinois House and Senate. 48 Indiana Senator Birch Bayh
encountered similar problems in 1972 when he tried to increase regulation of
handguns following an assassination attempt on Alabama Governor George
Wallace. 49 Both senators Jacob K. Javits of New York and Charles H. Percy of
Illinois confronted problems when they tried to introduce a federal ban on
41. Donald Janson, Fugitive Minutemen Never Aroused Suspicion in New Mexico, N.Y.
TIMES, July 20, 1969, at 47; see also 2 Held in Seizure of Machine Guns in California Raid, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 1969, at 51 (describing federal raid of weapons cache owned by “Nazi buff” James
Gary Steuard).
42. 15 Are Arrested in Weapons Raids: U.S. Agents in Midwest Act on ‘Illicit Gun Dealing,’
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1971, at 38; 2 Held With Truck Carrying Dynamite, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
1970, at 94; 6 Men and 1,151 Guns Seized in New York Area, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1980, at B8
(suspects arrested for sale of “gangster guns” that looked like “ball point pens and fire one bullet”);
Rap Brown Resentenced in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1972, at 18 (describing sentencing
of black militant for violation of the GCA); Martin Waldon, Militants Stockpile Illegal Guns Across
the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1969, at 42.
43. Naughton, supra note 30, at 1.
44. Id. at 1, 18.
45. Id. at 18.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Gun Controls Too Hot for Most Politicians, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 1972, at 1; Abner Mikva,
A Plea for Gun Control Legislation, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 16, 1971, at 24.
49. Bayh recommended an amendment to the GCA banning “the sale or transfer of any
handgun to anyone but a law enforcement officer” unless the gun was considered primarily aimed
at “lawful sporting purposes.” Ben A. Franklin, Shooting of Wallace Spurs a New Effort to Tighten
Gun Controls, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1972, at 29.
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handguns in “areas where violent crime is 20 per cent or more above the national
average.” 50 Though local urban populations tended to favor such bans, national
majorities proved skeptical. 51
Opponents of gun bans gained allies among sportsmen. In October 1969,
Massachusetts Senator Edward M. Kennedy failed to block an exception to the
GCA exempting certain types of shotgun shells popular among hunters from
licensing requirements. 52 Taking this as a sign that sportsmen should be
exempted, Indiana Senator Birch Bayh attempted to push through a more
restrictive federal gun control law, making sure to exempt weapons used for
“sporting purposes,” but failed. 53 Such political trends sent clear signals to the
NRA. Regardless of the Second Amendment’s text and the Supreme Court’s
ruling in United States v. Miller, frame alignment placed the greatest chance of
success on hunting weapons and handguns—not military style weapons. 54
By the 1990s, arguments in favor of an individual right to bear arms in selfdefense surged. Specifically, NRA advocates fleshed out the dual position that
not only was the right to bear arms an individual constitutional right, but the
right to bear arms in self-defense was an even greater, absolute right worthy of
constitutional protection independent of the Second Amendment. 55 For
example, NRA official Wayne LaPierre argued in 1994 that the “use of arms for
self-defense” was a right that derived from natural law itself, pre-dating the
founding. 56 One year later, Tanya Metaksa, executive director for the NRA’s

50. Nancy Hicks, Javits and Percy Ask Handgun Curb, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1975, at 37.
51. William E. Farrell, Majority at Hearing in Chicago Urges Congress to Ban Pistols, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 1975, at 24; Wayne King, Efforts to Curb Cheap Pistols Called Failure, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 1975, at 32; Robert Pear, Crime Bill Challenged by Conservative Republicans,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1980, at A17 (describing opposition to federal criminal code restricting
firearms by the conservative Senate Steering Committee). National opposition to gun control led
to a more localized approach, focusing on municipal bans. See, e.g., Joanna Dember, Trying a New
Tactic in Handgun Control, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1979, at 32.
52. Kennedy Plea Fails to Retain Gun Curb, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1969, at 13.
53. Gun Controls Too Hot for Most Politicians, supra note 48, at 4.
54. John Hinckley’s attempted assassination of Ronald Reagan created a surge of popular
support for gun regulation, culminating in the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act. Pub. L.
No. 103–159, 107 Stat. 1596 (1993) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–922 (2012)). A provision of the
law, U.S.C. § 922(s)(2), was invalidated by the Supreme Court in 1997. Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 936 (1997). The Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, a tenyear ban of assault weapons, was enacted by Congress in September 1994 and signed into law by
President Clinton. Pub. L. No. 103–322, 108 Stat. 1996 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 922 (2012)). The Act banning assault weapons was a subtitle of the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994. For a discussion of the attempted assassination of President Reagan
and the positions of proponents and opponents of gun control, see Michael Norman, The American
Duel over Guns, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1981, at 37.
55. WAYNE LAPIERRE, Self-Defense: The Right and the Deterrent, in GUNS, CRIME, AND
FREEDOM (1994), reprinted in GUNS IN AMERICA: A READER 174 (Jan E. Dizard et al. eds., 1999).
56. See id.
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Institute for Legislative Action, maintained that self-defense was nothing less
than “a primary civil right” without which “there are no rights.” 57
Metaksa and Pierre’s attempt to frame self-defense as an individual right
proved a deft effort to realign the cultural frames of the right to bear arms away
from communal ownership, i.e., militias, and towards individual ownership, a
move that proved strategically sound after a disgruntled ex-soldier with militia
ties named Timothy McVeigh bombed an Oklahoma City federal building in
1995. 58 Cognizant of the popular outrage that surged over McVeigh, the NRA
took an overtly public stand against militias, even hiring Hollywood celebrity
Charlton Heston—famous for playing Moses in the film The Ten
Commandments—to soften the organization’s image, meanwhile embarking on
a new frame alignment campaign, this time associating the right to bear arms
with civil rights. 59
Declaring itself “America’s oldest civil rights organization,” the NRA
worked diligently to link the cause of gun owners to the longstanding struggle
for racial equality in the United States. In 2008, for example, just as Barack
Obama vaulted to the forefront of American politics, the NRA joined other
social movement actors interested in gun rights, including the Congress of Racial
Equality (“CORE”) to argue for an individual right to bear arms—free from any
ties to militias. 60 The case targeted a handgun ban in Washington, D.C., but
strummed civil rights chords that went as far back as 1942, the year CORE was
founded as an organization dedicated to non-violent resistance against racial
segregation in the American South. 61 In 1947, CORE targeted segregation on
interstate carriers by staging an integrated bus ride through Virginia, North
Carolina, Tennessee, and Kentucky, something it called the “Journey of
Reconciliation.” 62 In 1961, under the leadership of James Farmer, CORE
orchestrated a similar protest by sponsoring integrated buses filled with
“freedom riders” through Deep South states like Alabama where white mobs set
fire to one bus and brutalized the occupants of another. 63
Precisely because CORE activists found themselves confronting relentless
instances of white violence, the organization gradually grew weary of nonviolence as a political strategy, particularly non-violent refusals to engage in
armed self-defense. 64 Indeed, by the close of 1966, CORE president Floyd

57. Tanya K. Metaksa, Self-Defense: A Primary Civil Right, in AM. RIFLEMAN, Nov. 1995, at
74 reprinted in GUNS IN AMERICA: A READER 194 (Jan E. Dizard et al. eds., 1999).
58. Todd S. Purdam, Clinton Assails the Preachings of the ‘Militias,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 6,
1995, at 1, 9.
59. Siegel, supra note 33, at 232.
60. Walker, supra note 31, at 527.
61. Id. at 509–10.
62. Id. at 516.
63. Id.
64. Walker, supra note 31, at 517–18.
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McKissick joined Stokely Carmichael, a coordinator for the Student NonViolent Coordinating Committee (“SNCC”), in calling for armed self-defense
and “black power.” 65 By the time of CORE’s 1966 convention in Baltimore,
McKissick had begun to publicly declare non-violence a “dying philosophy.” 66
Convinced that non-violence had become ineffectual and that black equality
hinged on gun ownership and armed self-defense, CORE focused its brief in the
D.C. case, styled District of Columbia v. Heller, on the Fourteenth Amendment,
arguing that many of the Amendment’s framers intended that the Due Process
and Privileges and Immunities Clauses be used to protect the rights of freed
slaves to own guns. 67 Though the NRA resisted such an argument, Second
Amendment expert Alan Gura, the Institute for Justice, and a majority of United
States senators and congressmen agreed, marking a significant effort to align the
legal frame of private gun ownership with the cultural frame of black rights. 68
The Supreme Court, perhaps surprisingly, sanctioned this reasoning,
adopting the originalist claim that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
protect black gun ownership, even though the Amendment itself did not
technically apply to the District of Columbia. 69 Why the Court cited such
evidence was not clear as a matter of law. 70 However, the Court’s decision to
cite the Fourteenth Amendment argument may ultimately have had less to do
with legal doctrine than frame alignment. Precisely because CORE had linked
gun ownership to black rights, the citation of black history might have appealed
to the Court as a progressive way of framing gun rights, particularly at a moment
when an African American was positioning himself for the presidency. Whether
Obama’s bid for the White House was on the minds of the Supreme Court or
not, his frame aligned with the effort to pitch self-defense as a civil right, a
convergence that became clear when Obama himself publicly endorsed the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Heller not long after it was decided. 71
Immediately following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Heller, Second
Amendment activist Alan Gura filed a complaint in the Northern District of
Illinois, arguing that Chicago’s handgun ban, in place since 1982, violated the
Second Amendment. Parallel suits followed, including two suits by the NRA,

65. AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOT M. RUDWICK, CORE: A STUDY IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 1942 – 1968, at 412 (Univ. of Ill. Press 1975) (1973).
66. Id. at 414.
67. Walker, supra note 31, at 515–27.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Siegel, supra note 33, at 232.
71. Robert Barnes, Justices Reject D.C. Ban on Handgun Ownership, WASH. POST, June 27,
2008, at A1.
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one against the Village of Oak Park, Illinois, and the other against the City of
Chicago. 72
Both the NRA and Gura argued, as in Heller, that the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to protect freed people of color in the post-Civil War
South by protecting their right to bear arms against confiscation by Klangoverned southern states. 73 However, the NRA stressed the Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, while Gura dedicated a majority of his brief to the Amendment’s
Privileges and Immunities Clause. 74 This divergence, though subtle, represented
its own form of cultural frame alignment. By aligning his brief with the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, Gura hoped to gain the support of legal
academics and liberals who opposed the Supreme Court’s narrow curtailment of
the Clause in a Reconstruction-era ruling styled the Slaughter-House Cases. 75
Gura’s decision to focus on privileges and immunities, in other words,
represented a classic case of frame bridging—he connected the cause of gun
owners to a larger panoply of liberal positions.
Conversely, the NRA pursued a more conservative, less liberal line of
argument, pushing the Court to incorporate the Second Amendment through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 76 This represented its own
form of frame alignment, a bid to keep conservative support for gun rights high,
including conservative support on the Supreme Court, without appearing to
pander to liberals. During oral argument, for example, Justice Scalia endorsed
the idea of incorporating the Second Amendment to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but objected to the Privileges and
Immunities Clause argument as the “darling of the professoriate.” 77 Justice Alito
agreed, making it clear in the Court’s majority opinion that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause would be untouched, while holding that the Second
Amendment should in fact be incorporated to the states on account of the fact

72. The district court judge joined the two NRA actions and ruled in favor of the bans in
National Rifle Ass’n v. Village of Oak Park, 617 F. Supp. 2d 752 (N.D. Ill. 2008). The court
simultaneously dismissed Gura’s action. Gura and the NRA both appealed and the Seventh Circuit
consolidated the appeals into McDonald v. City of Chicago.
73. Brief for Petitioner at 6, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (No. 081521).
74. Robert Barnes, NRA Avoids Getting Shut Out of Gun Case, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2010, at
A13.
75. Tony Mauro, Liberals Use Supreme Court Gun Ban to Bolster Other Rights, LAW.COM
(Feb. 24, 2009, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/almID/1202428529045; Adam Liptak, Justices
Will Weigh Challenges to Gun Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2009, at A17.
76. For the dispute between Gura and the NRA over litigation strategy, see Barnes, supra note
74, at A13.
77. Adam Liptak, Justices Seem to Lean Toward Extending Individual Right to Own Guns,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2010, at A14.
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that “the right to keep and bear arms was highly valued for purposes of selfdefense.” 78
CONCLUSION
The Court’s emphasis on self-defense in McDonald was revealing, an
indication that the gun lobby’s frame alignment strategies had worked. Despite
differences in litigation strategy, in other words, both the NRA and Alan Gura
had agreed on one thing: litigating against handgun bans as infringements on the
right to self-defense represented a more strategic alignment of legal and cultural
frames than trying to overturn more stringent regulations, like the GCA’s limits
on military-style weapons. Though the Supreme Court had once maintained that
military-style weapons were the only weapons protected by the Second
Amendment, the NRA and other proponents of gun rights like Gura realized that
such a position had become politically and culturally untenable by the close of
the twentieth century. Indeed, while the NRA did indicate support for a bill
tightening the definition of machine guns in 2007, its litigation team steered
clear of an outright challenge, indicating that the lobby had learned the value of
cultural frame alignment. 79 That both the NRA and Gura made black rights a
cornerstone of their Second Amendment arguments in Heller and McDonald
leaves us with perhaps the most compelling example of frame alignment, an
effort to align a constitutional position with the ascendance of America’s first
African-American president. To students interested in knowing why the Second
Amendment became activated when it did, and in the way it did, the language
of cultural frames provides a helpful analytic. 80

78. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 758–59, 770.
79. Gary Emerling & David C. Lipscomb, Gun Control Still in Force, Chief Says:
Semiautomatics Banned, WASH. TIMES, June 28, 2008, at A1.
80. Popular support for gun control dwindled during the first decade of the twentieth century,
increasing the Legal Opportunity Structure for federal cases like Heller and McDonald. To take
just a few examples, a 2008 Gallup poll indicated that only twenty-eight percent of Americans
favored an absolute ban on handguns, significantly lower from the time the poll was first taken in
1959, when sixty percent of the population favored a total ban. Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., RecordLow Support for Stricter Gun Laws, GALLUP (Oct. 9, 2009), http://news.gallup.com/poll/123596/
in-u.s.-record-low-support-stricter-gun-laws.aspx. According to a CNN/Opinion Research
Corporation poll conducted in 2009, only thirty-nine percent of Americans favored stricter gun
laws of any kind, much less outright bans. Bill Schneider, Poll: Fewer Americans Support Stricter
Gun Control Laws, CNN (Apr. 8, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/08/gun.con
trol.poll/ [https://perma.cc/2JNP-7Z4G].

